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An Involuntary Mental Patient's Right to Refuse
Treatment with Antipsychotic Drugs:
A Reassessment
State and federal courts generally agree that a competent,I involuntary mental
patient2 possesses the right to partake in his own treatment decisions. In the late
1970s, however, rights of incompetent, 3 involuntary mental patients in the area of
treatment with psychotrophic-particularly antipsychotic-medication began to rise
to levels comparable to those of competent patients. Lawsuits brought on behalf of
mental patients, along with increased public awareness of the poor conditions of
many mental hospitals, forced several state and federal courts to recognize an
incompetent, involuntary mental patient's right to refuse treatment with antipsychot-
ics.4 Both competent and incompetent involuntary mental patients now possess
extensive rights in the management of their treatment.
The history of the recognition of the patient's right to refuse, however, is
characterized by inconsistency. Several federal courts which first considered the issue
of the right to refuse treatment with antipsychotics recognized a constitutional right
to refuse under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 5 The Supreme Court,
however, later limited the effect of those earlier decisions in its remand of Rennie v.
Klein 6 and in its decision in Mills v. Rogers.7
i. "Competence," as used in this Article, is defined as having the mental capacity to make one's own medical
treatment decisions, notwithstanding civil commitment based on general incompetence. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 634
F.2d 650, 657 (lst. Cir. 1980) ("whether the patient has the capacity to make a reasoned decision with respect to [the]
proposed treatment.. ." (footnote omitted)), quoted in Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 498, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343, 504
N.Y.S.2d 74, 81 (1986).
2. An "involuntary mental patient" is a person who is civilly committed in a state mental institution against his
will.
3. As opposed to "competence," "incompetence" is not possessing the mental capacity to make one's own
medical treatment decisions. See generally Roth, Meisel & Lidz, Test of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 Ai.
J. PsycHiATR 279 (1977).
The thesis of this Comment assumes that the competency determination of the patient has been made and that the
patient already has been deemed incompetent.
4. See generally DuBose, Of the Parens Patriae Commitment Power and Drug Treatment of Schizophrenia: Do
the Benefits to the Patient Justify Involuntary Treatment?, 60 Mom. L. REv 449 (1976); Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs,
Professionalism, and the Constitution, 72 GEo. L.J. 1725 (1984); Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotrophic Drugs, 15
HARV. C. R. C. L. REv. 363 (1980); Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE
L.J. 219 (1985); Note, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drug Treatment: Substantive Rights and Procedural Guidelines
in Massachusetts, 7 W. Nrw F%.a. L. Rev. 125 (1984); Note, A Common Law Remedy for the Forcible Medication of the
Institutionalized Mentally Ill, 82 Cowm. L. REv. 1720 (1982).
5. See Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass.
1979), aff'din part, rev'din part, 634 F.2d 650 (lst Cir. 1980), vacatedsub nom, Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982);
Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (class certified; preliminary injunction granted), modified, 653 F.2d
836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
6. 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
7. 457 U.S. 291 (1982).
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In Rennie, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that an involuntary
mental patient's right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic medication is a protected
liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment.8 In addition, the court of appeals
devised a rather elaborate due process mechanism to protect that right. 9 On appeal,
the Supreme Court vacated the Third Circuit's decision in Rennie,10 remanding it for
decision in light of Youngberg v. Romeo," a 1982 Supreme Court decision. In
Romeo, the Court considered "for the first time the substantive [due process] rights
of involuntarily committed mentally retarded persons."' 2 Romeo, a "profoundly
retarded" man with the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child, had been
committed to a Pennsylvania state mental institution at the behest of his mother. 13
After Romeo's commitment, his mother became concerned about injuries he had
suffered in the institution. She filed a section 1983 action as his "next friend"
claiming that officials of the institution had violated his constitutional rights by failing
to take appropriate measures to protect him against injuries. 14 That suit presented the
Court with the question of whether Romeo had "substantive rights under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii)
freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training or 'habilitation.' "'Is The Court held
that the Constitution required only the exercise of professional judgment by a member
of the professional staff in the deprivation of the patient's rights.16 Decisions made by
professionals were therefore to be deemed "presumptively valid."1 7 Only where the
decision was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not
base the decision on such a judgment" could liability be imposed. 18 The Court
justified its holding by saying:
Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions of this type--often, unfortu-
nately, overcrowded and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may
have to make decisions with respect to a number of residents with widely varying needs and
problems in the course of a normal day. The administrators, and particularly professional
personnel should not be required to make each decision in the shadow of an action for
damages. '9
Therefore, on remand, the Third Circuit in Rennie was to analyze the patient's right
in light of "presumptively valid" treatment decisions under the Romeo standard.
The Court in Mills v. Rogers held that an involuntary mental patient only
possesses a qualified fourteenth amendment right to refuse treatment with
8. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 843 (3d Cir. 1981).
9. Id. at 848-54.
10. Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982) vacating 653 F.2d 836 (3d. Cir. 1981).
11. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
12. Id. at 314.
13. Id. at 309-10.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 309.
16. Id. at 323.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 324-25.
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antipsychotics. 20 Nevertheless, the Court in Mills did acknowledge that states are free
to provide more protection under their own constitutional or statutory due process
provisions. 2' Therefore, though it is a bit uncertain, it seems from the Supreme
Court's dispositions of Youngberg, Rennie, and Mills, that the federal courts will
recognize an involuntary patient's constitutional right to refuse treatment, yet will
limit the due process protection to shield that right.
Many states, as a result, have responded with vigor to the involuntary patient's
situation and have provided extensive due process protection for the involuntary
patient. 22 Thus, a dichotomy has arisen-in the right-to-refuse area-between
Romeo's call for increased judicial deference to professional decisions on the one hand,
and the expansive protection states have provided to involuntary patients on the other.
This Comment will address this dichotomy and propose a more limited right of
an involuntary mental patient to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs along with
a different state due process procedure which provides state protection of that right.
This Comment initially discusses the historical background of the states' recognition
of the right and addresses the nature of antipsychotic medication. It then analyzes and
criticizes the judicial analyses of the facts surrounding the right to refuse treatment
cases and calls for a much more qualified right to refuse treatment. This Comment
also analyzes the procedural mechanisms courts have established to protect the
patient's right. Finally, it also sets forth alternative factors for courts and legislatures
to consider in establishing due process protection for the patient's right to refuse
treatment in light of Part II's proposal for a more qualified right.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Incompetent, Involuntary Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment with
Antipsychotic Medication
The state courts' analyses recognizing the right to refuse treatment are similar.
Since state judicial decisions finding this right have relied heavily on pre-Mills federal
decisions, 23 as well as state precedent, in reaching their conclusions, both state and
pre-Mills federal decisions must be studied in order to fully comprehend the rationale
state courts have used in recognizing the incompetent, involuntary patient's right to
refuse treatment. The analysis courts have used can be broken down into three
primary elements. The first element focuses on the nature of antipsychotic medica-
tion. The courts which have recognized a right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic
drugs have viewed these drugs with great suspicion. 24 In general, they have focused
20. 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982).
21. Id. at 300.
22. See, e.g., Goedecke v. State, 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123 (1979); In re Roe, III, 383 Mass. 415,421 N.E.2d
40 (1981); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); State ex. rel. Hawks v. Lazaro,
157 W.Va. 417, 202 S.E.2d 109 (1974).
23. See supra note 5.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 62-80.
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on the drugs' deleterious short-term and long-term side effects without carefully
considering their positive, therapeutic effects.2
The constitutional application of the various state due process provisions to the
nature of antipsychotic drugs comprises the second element. These various due
process provisions protect the patient's liberty interest in freedom from govern-
ment interference with one's mental processes and with one's body.26 The courts
recognizing this right have held that since antipsychotic medication is inherently
detrimental to the patient, so long as the patient is competent to make his own
treatment decisions, the patient's decision to refuse treatment with the medication is
part of the patient's protected liberty interest under both state and federal due process
clauses.2 7 Thus, the first element's factual determination regarding the nature of the
medication is "bound-up" with the second element's constitutional application. By
opining that the drugs' deleterious effects outweigh their positive effects on the
patient, it was relatively simple for the courts recognizing a right to refuse treatment
to conclude that these deleterious effects pose a threat to mental patient's liberty
interest. From this recognition that the drugs present a real danger to the patient, the
courts have made two conclusions. First, the courts have reasoned that some sort of
process is due in order to determine whether the patient is competent to make his own
treatment decision.2 8 Second, if the patient is deemed incompetent, due process is
required to determine whether the treatment proposed is "least restrictive" in terms
of the drugs' negative effect(s) on the patient and the availability of any alternatives
to the use of antipsychotic treatment.2 9
The third and final element of the right to refuse analysis is the state's interest
in treating the patient. The courts, in general, have held that the right to refuse
treatment is qualified by several legitimate state interests which may override the
patients' protected liberty interest. First, if the patient presents a danger to himself or
to others, the state may use its police power to forcibly medicate the patient.30 Second,
if the patient does not possess the competence necessary to make his own treatment
decisions, the state may use its parens patriae power to forcibly medicate the patient.3'
The treatment the state proposes, however, must be the "least restrictive"-that is,
the deleterious side effects of the drugs administered to the patient must be no more
25. Id.
26. See generally Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 844-46 (3d Cir.
1981); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915,929-36 (N.D. Ohio 1980); In re Roe. III, 383 Mass. 415,433 n.9,421 N.E.
41, 51 n.9 (1981); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 78 (1986); In re K.K.B.,
609 P.2d 747, 749 (Okla. 1980).
27. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 843-44 (3d Cir. 1981); Rogers v. Okn, 634 F.2d 650, 656, 659-60 (1st
Cir. 1980).
28. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 848-52 (3d Cir. 1981); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650,659-60 (lst Cir. 1980).
29. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 845 (3d Cir. 1981); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 654-55 (Ist Cir. 1980);
In re Roe, III, 383 Mass. 415, 434-43, 421 N.E.2d 41, 52-56 (1981); see also Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915,
934-35 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
30. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 845 (3d Cir. 1981); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935 (N.D. Ohio
1980); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 498, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 81 (1986).
31. Parens patriae refers traditionally to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under legal
disability. See generally West Virginia v. Chas Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971).
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severe than necessary in order to effectively treat the patient.32 Therefore, the courts
must determine whether the patient is competent to make his decision and, if not,
whether the treatment plan proposed is indeed "least restrictive."
B. The Nature of Antipsychotic Medication
1. In General
Antipsychotics are psychotrophic drugs used, in general, to treat schizophrenic
and other psychotic disorders. 33 They are widely accepted in present psychiatric
practice as the treatment of choice for schizophrenia. 34 Because the controversy in the
right to refuse treatment cases has centered primarily around the forcible use of
antipsychotics, their effects and side effects have received the greatest attention.
Psychotic patients with schizophrenic symptoms such as loose association, 35
autism, 36 hallucinations, 37 delusions, 38 and paranoid ideation 39 normally are treated
antipsychotics. The prescribed antipsychotic is designed to alleviate the severity of
these symptoms, as well as restore the patient's cognitive faculties. 40 Though the
drugs are not a "cure" for schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders, many
psychiatrists maintain that such alleviation is a necessary component of successful
treatment. 4'
The initial effect of the drugs is sedative. 42 According to several medical
authorities, this sedative effect must be distinguished from the drugs' antipsychotic
effect, which may take several weeks to fully develop. 43 The positive antipsychotic
effects are varied. In schizophrenic patients, various studies demonstrate that
32. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 844-46 (3d Cir. 1981); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935 (N.D.
Ohio 1980).
33. See generally A. C.AcRo, ScHizoPHREstA: CuuisI. AsPEcTs AND BIOLIGicA. BASES OF PsaciATsiuc DisoRouEs (1977).
34. Rone v. Frieman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 108 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
35. In psychiatry, "loose association" is a disorder in thinking in which associations of ideas become so shortened,
fragmented, and disturbed as to lack logical relationship. DoRLAND'S ILausRAmoT, MEDiCAL DiC'nONARY 130 (26th ed. 1985).
36. "Autism" is defined as the condition of being dominated by subjective, self-centered trends of thought or
behavior. Id. at 140.
37. "Hallucinations" are a sense perception without a source in the external world; a perception of an external
stimulus object in the absence of such an object. Id. at 578.
38. "Delusions" are a false personal belief based on incorrect inferences about external reality and firmly
maintained in spite of incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. Id. at 355.
39. "Paranoia" is a chronic, slowly progressive mental disorder characterized by the development of ambitions or
suspicions into systematized delusions of persecution and grandeur which are built up in a logical form. Id. at 966.
40. See, e.g,, THE NATIO.AL INsT urE oF MENTAL HEALTH PsYcuOPnwsiAcowov SRvicE CENTER Cou..ABoRAIv STUDY
GROUP, Phenothiazine Treatment in Acute Schizophrenia: Effectiveness, 10 ARcuivEs GEN. PSYC'mATRY 246 (1964);
Goldberg, Klerman, & Cole, Changes in Schizophrenic Psychopathology and Ward Behaviour as a Function of
Phenothiazine Treatment, 111 Birr. J. PsYcHLuRy 120 (1965).
41. See generally D. KLEN , R. GiuzrswN, F. Quram & A. Ripm, DiAoNosis AND DRUG TREATMENr oF PsYCHITRIuc
DisoRDms: ADnLos AND Cuaaiiire 88-144 (2d ed. 1980); Gutheil & Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic Sanity,"
"Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 Ho-RzA L.
REv. 77, 100-01 (1983).
42. Byck, Drugs and the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in THE P -HARAcoLomicAL BASTS OF TtHErtuncs 158 (L.
Goodman & A. Gilman eds. 1975).
43. Id.; Frazier & Winokur, Therapeutic and PharmacologicalAspects ofPsychotrophic Drugs, in Bio.ooicA. BASES
OF PsvcuzATric DisoREsRs 151, 156 (A. Frazier & A. Winokur eds. 1977); Fink & Abrams, Selective Drug Therapies in
Clinical Psychiatry; Neuroleptic, Anxiolytic, and Antimanic Agents, in TR EAnro MENrAL lumm 287, 306 (A. Freedman
& H. Kaplan eds. 1972).
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antipsychotics: (1) reduce mental confusion and improve speech order;44 (2) reduce
conceptual disorganization; 45 (3) reduce errors on the digit symbol subtest of the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale;46 (4) reduce delays of information processing;47
and (5) reduce overinclusive thinking. 48 In addition, at least one study has determined
that when treatment is successful, discontinuation of the medication will often lead to
a relapse of the illness. 49
Many of the judicial opinions recognizing a right to refuse have emphasized the
deleterious side effects of antipsychotics.50 It is clear from the medical literature that
such side effects do occur. With regard to short-term side effects, judicial emphasis
has been on the most extreme side effects, a class of motor impairments including
dystonias,sl dyskinesias,5 2 and akathisia.5 3 Though these effects can be quite severe,
they can all be alleviated through either a reduction in the dose of medication or
through the administration of "anti-parkisonian" medication, a drug which counter-
acts the effects of the antipsychotics on the motor system without interfering with the
beneficial effects on cognition. 54
One of the long-term side effects courts often refered to in the right-to-refuse
cases is tardive dyskinesia.5 5 The symptoms of tardive dyskinesia include involuntary
movements of the muscles of the face, arm, and leg.56 However, tardive dyskinesias
usually appears only after prolonged use. 57 Although the incidence of tardive
dyskinesias is unclear, it has been estimated that ten to forty percent of patients
receiving long-term treatment may be affected.5 8 Most courts which have recognized
an involuntary patient's right to refuse treatment, however, have overlooked the fact
that the symptoms of tardive dyskinesias are usually mild, not necessarily progres-
sive, and very often disappear if the administration of the antipsychotic is halted.5 9
Thus, though antipsychotics do possess the potential for causing adverse short and
44. Porteus, Specific Behavior Changes Following Chlorpromazine, 21 J. CONSuL=NG PsYcsOLooy 257, 260 (1957).
45. Abrams, Chlorpromazine in Treatment of Chronic Schizophrenia, 19 DIsEssS NEsvous SYsnMi 20, 27-28
(1958). See also Clark, Ray & Ragland, Chlorpromazine in Chronic Schizophrenic Women: Rate of Onset and Rate of
Dissipation of Drug Effects, 25 Pscuso.xnc MED. 212 (1963).
46. The Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale is a successor to the Wesehler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale (WBIS). The
WBIS is an early version of the standard IQ test that compares subjects' responses on a large number of questions to
standardized norms. The test has a number of subsections that measure both verbal and performance skills. Gutheil &
Appelbaum, supra note 41, at 104.
47. Baff & Saccuzzo, Effect of Antipsychotic Medication on Speed of Information Processing in Schizophrenic
Patients, 139 Am. J. PsYcHATY 1127 (1982).
48. Phillipson, Baker & Williams, Changes in "Overinclusive" Thinking of Schizophrenic Patients is Related to
Plasma Phenothiazine Concentration, 24 AovAscss IN BiocHmcaAL PsvacoPuAntAcoLooY 591 (1980).
49. Davis, Overview: Maintenance Therapy in Psychiatry L: Schizophrenia, 132 A. J. Psycm.ATRY 1237 (1975).
50. See infra text accompanying notes 58-77.
51. The label "dystonia" desribes acute and often painful spasms of muscle groups in the neck, back, face, eyes,
or elsewhere in the body. DosLpA's ILusmTr MEDicA. Dicnomity 415 (26th ed. 1985).
52. "Dyskinesias" is a condition of involuntary, repetitive motor movements, such as flicking the tongue in and
out of the mouth or complex movements of the fingers. Id. at 412.
53. "Akathisia" is an emotional state characterized by a subjective need or desire to move. Id. at 42.
54. See Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 41, at 108.
55. See, e.g., Davis. v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 928-29 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485,
490 n.1, 495 N.E.2d 337, 339 n.1, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 76 n.1 (1986).
56. AsmucAN PsvcuiArec AssOaATIoN, TASK Fopcs REPoRT No. 18: TRDoivE DysrWEsA 57 (1979).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 44.
59. Id. at 24-28.
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long-term side effects, these side effects can be avoided, reduced, or even eliminated
through careful medical monitoring and remedial action.
60
2. Judicial Perceptions of Antipsychotic Drugs-The First Element
The first element of the right-to-refuse analysis concerns judicial perceptions of
antipsychotics. In general, the courts which have recognized a right to refuse have
viewed these drugs with a great deal of suspicion. Though there are a large number
of medical studies which have found treatment with antipsychotic drugs positive and
that any negative side effects can be effectively mitigated, 61 the courts have focused
primarily on the deleterious short and long-term side effects of the medication without
carefully considering these positive apsects and mitigating devices. A clash has
therefore surfaced between various psychiatric perceptions and the majority of
judicial perceptions of antipsychotics.
The state opinions which have recognized a right to refuse treatment have been
fairly consistent in scrutinizing the therapeutic benefits of antipsychotic medication. 62
Each of the following opinions either ignores or belittles the powerful medical
literature available concerning the positive effects antipsychotics may have on the
patient. The opinions also ignore the fact that any deleterious side effects which may
arise through treatment with the drug can be adequately mitigated by the treating
physician. Instead, as in the federal opinions, the courts unfairly characterize
antipsychotics in conclusory and pejorative terms which minimize the postive
attributes of antipsychotic medication.
For example, in Goedecke v. State63 the Colorado Supreme Court found that a
civilly committed inpatient possessed the right to refuse treatment with the
antipsychotic drug prolixin. 64 The court focused on prolixin's negative side effects
and determined that the physicians had chosen to use prolixin in treatment in order to
"alter [the patient's] psychotic thought patterns." ' 65 The court also emphasized
prolixin's "behavior-modifying capacity," and detailed its negative side effects. 66
60, See Gutheil & Appelbaum, supra note 41 at 109.
61, The studies emphasizing the therapeutic benefits of antipsychotics are too numerous to list in one footnote. For
articles listing many of these studies, see generally Appelbaum & Gutheil, The Boston State Hospital Case: "Involuntary
Mind Control," the Constitution and the "Right to Rot" 137 A%. J. PsYcHIATRY 720 (1980); Appelbaum & Gutheil,
"Rotting With Their Rights On": Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refitsal by Psychiatric Patients,
BtaL. A,.i. AcAD. PsycHATRY & LUw 306 (1979); Gutheil, Restraint vs. Treatment: Seclusion as Discussed in the Boston
State Hospital Case, 137 A. J. PsvcrnARY 718 (1980). There are, however, many articles listing studies with opposing
views. These studies have caught the courts' attention much more frequently than the former studies. For articles listing
such studies, see generally Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw.
U.L. Rzv. 461 (1977); Rhoden, TheRight to Refuse PsychotrophicDrugs, 15 H-Dv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 363 (1980); Note,
The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drug Treatment: Substantive Rights and Procedural Guidelines in Massachusetts, 7 W.
NEw Ea. L. Rsv. 125 (1984); Note, A Common Lav Remedyfor the Forcible Medication of the Institutionalized Mentally
Il, 82 Co .s. L. REv. 1720 (1982). At the very least, this argument concerning the benefits of antipsychotics suggests
that courts should analyze the effects of antipsychotics more closely, for the area is not as clear as the courts' opinions
suggest.
62. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1360 (D. Mass. 1979).
63. 198 Colo. 407, 603 P.2d 123 (1979).
64, Id. at 411, 603 P.2d at 125.
65. Id. at 409-10, 603 P.2d at 124.
66. Id.
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Another example is In re K.K.B.,67 where the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in
finding a right to refuse, characterized the antipsychotic medication in derogatory
language similar to that of the other opinions which had recognized the right.63 The
court concerned itself almost exclusively with the drug's deleterious side effects and
de-emphasized any 'therapeutic benefits. Indeed, the court generalized that the
medication was marginally beneficial in treating a schizophrenic patient: "[T]he
precise nature of the benefits of these drugs is as yet uncertain and the dangers the
drugs seek to avoid are usually not great.'' 69
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's opinion in In re Roe, 11170 utilizes
the same approach. In Roe, the Massachusetts court characterized the drugs in the
following negative fashion:
A single injection of Haldol... can be effective for ten to fourteen days. The drugs
are powerful enough to immobilize mind and body. Because of both the profound effect that
these drugs have on the thought processes of an individual and the well-established
likelihood of severe and irreversible adverse side effects ... we treat these drugs in the
same manner we would treat psychosurgery or electroconvulsive therapy .... While the
actual physical invasion involved in the administration of these drugs amounts to no more
than an injection, the impact of the chemicals upon the brain is sufficient to undermine the
foundations of personality. 7'
In addition, the court unfairly emphasized the "extreme" nature of
antispychotic treatment and stated that "among the most important reasons for their
continued use is to control behavior." 72 This simply is not true as the previous
discussion of antipsychotics indicates. 73
Finally, the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Rivers v. Katz74 held that
treatment with antipsychotic drugs is presumptively harmful and discounted the
beneficial impact the drugs may have on the patient:
Antipsychotic drugs, also known as "major tranquilizers" and "neuroleptics," are
psychotrophic drugs widely used in the treatment of mental illness, especially schizophrenia.
Although they do not cure psychotic illness, their medical usefulness stems from their ability
to influence thought patterns so as to eliminate psychotic symptoms .... Numerous side
effects are associated with their usage .... The most potentially devastating side effect is
tardive dyskinesia, an irreversible neurological disorder characterized by involuntary,
rhythmic and grotesque movements of the face, mouth, tongue, jaw and extremities.
Although this condition is fairly widespread, it is impossible to predict who will be a
victim . . .7
These various state opinions indicate a strong judicial prejudice against
antipsychotics in right-to-refuse cases. This prejudice, in turn, forces the courts
67. 609 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1980).
68. Id. at 748 n.3.
69. Id. at 748.
70. 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
71. Id. at 436-37, 421 N.E.2d at 52-53.
72. Id. at 437, 421 N.E.2d at 53.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 33-60.
74. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
75. Id. at 490 n.1, 495 N.E.2d at 339 n.1, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 76 n.1.
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addressing the issue to recognize a broad right to refuse. However, as will be shown,
if the courts perceive antipsychotics more realistically, a more limited right for the
patient should result.
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE COURTS' PERCEPTION OF ANTIPSYCHOTICS UNDER THE
FIRST ELEMENT
A constitutional right to refuse treatment with antipsychotics, as earlier stated,
is based on the patient's liberty interest. 76 In order for the patient's interest to be
asserted there must be a sufficient threat to that interest. In determining whether such
a threat is present, two factors are relevant. First, the patient is confined to a mental
institution against his will in order to be treated. This is a facet of the right-to-refuse
cases which nearly every court has either overlooked or simply glossed over. 77
Therefore, there is a compelling state interest in treating the patient in order that he
may one day return to society as a "normal" citizen. In addition, the patient must be
treated or else he is being unconstitutionally confined. For example, in Ohio, it is
statutorily required that the patient either be treated or released. 78 Other states have
similar statutory provisions. 79 If the state has confined the patient and if the state must
treat the patient, then it logically follows that a presumption is created in favor of the
state in treating the patient, so long as the patient is incompetent to make his own
treatment decisions.80 If the patient is competent, however, then the state cannot
forcibly medicate the patient absent other compelling state interests. 81 This presump-
tion in favor of treatment does not end the analysis in determining whether a threat
to the patient's liberty interest is present because the mere state of confinement does
not mean a state can arbitrarily infringe upon the patient's constitutional rights.
Second, antipsychotics do not pose a substantial threat to the patient's liberty
interest if mitigating factors are present. 82 Antipsychotics do cause negative side
effects.8 3 But they also cause positive effects. 84 Yet the courts have felt comfortable
in discarding these positive effects and finding the negative effects more compelling.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 30-60.
77. This does not mean it has been completely ignored. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
78. Onto REv. CoD ANN. § 5122.27 (Anderson 1981). Cf. Rone v. Frieman, 473 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ohio 1979),
where the court held that where a patient is confined he must be treated by the state with the "means least burdensome
to the patient."
79. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. A -i. § 36-540 (1986); CAL. W~u. & lasr. Cos § 5008(n) (West 1984); IowA CODE
Arm. § 229.1 (Vest 1985); N.Y. MExrAL HYG. LAw § 31.31 (McKinney 1978); S. C. Cos Ar. § 44-17-580 (Law. Co-op.
1985).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28. See also State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 394, 316 A.2d 449, 456
(1974) (treatment is "inherent in the rationale [for committment]").
81. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30. See also Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 258-59, 239 N.W.2d
905, 911 (1976):
The question in the case before us is whether the state, consistent with [plaintiff's] right of privacy, can assume
the decision of whether Iplantiff), an involuntarily committed mental patient, will undergo psychiatric
treatment. We observe that the more fundamental decision, whether he was to undergo hospitalization, was
assumed by the state at the committment proceeding, the validity of which is not contested. . . . If th[e]
interest of the state is sufficiently important to deprive an individual of his physical liberty, it would seem to
follow that it would be sufficiently important for the state to assume the treatment decision. We hold that it is.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 50-60.
83. See supra text accompanying notes 50-57.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 42-49.
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Such loaded terms as "involuntary mind control" are used casually, familiarly, and
uncritically, and are therefore wrong. These characterizations are simply not in
conformity with a great deal of medical analysis.85 As a consequence, these implicit
pejorative connotations downplay the essentially therapeutic, normative, and restor-
ative effects of properly prescribed antipsychotic medication. These positive effects
act as a counter to the intrusion on the patient's liberty interest. Moreover, the courts'
negative connotations also ignore the mitigating devices of proper medical supervi-
sion and remedial action. In addition, the courts' language does not reveal the fact
that psychiatrists do not administer antipsychotics in an attempt to "control" minds,
but rather to restore minds to the patient's control. 86 Interestingly, these decisions
ignore the decisions in criminal cases concerning the effect of antipsychotic drugs.
These latter cases present quite a different view of antipsychotics. In the following
cases, a mentally ill defendant has been treated with antipsychotic medication to
enable him both to properly assist his attorney and to understand the proceedings
against him.8 7 Often these defendants allege insanity as a defense and argue,
therefore, that they are entitled to present their true demeanor and mental disposition
before the jury and have a right to be tried in an unmedicated state.88
In State v. Jojola,89 the Court of Appeals of New Mexico refused to recognize
a fifth amendment-based right of a criminal defendant to stand trial in an unmedicated
state. In so holding, the court characterized the therapeutic effects of antispychotic
medication as follows:
There is no evidence that [the drug] affected defendant's thought processes or the
content of defendant's thoughts; the affirmative evidence is that [the drug] allows the
cognitive part of the brain to come back into play. The expert witness declined to call [the
drug] a mind altering drug. Rather, [the drug] allows the mind to operate as it might were
there not some organic or other type of illness affecting the mind.90
In State v. Hayes,9 1 the New Hampshire Supreme Court refused to find that the
defendant had an absolute fifth amendment right to refuse to stand trial because he
had been treated with antipsychotic drugs. In so holding, the court found that
antipsychotics possess substantial normalizing tendencies which aid in restoring the
patient's competency:
In the case before us there is no evidence that the drugs administered to the defendant
affected the process or content of his thoughts. To the contrary, all the evidence indicates
that the drugs used here allow the cognitive part of the defendant's brain, which has been
altered by the mental disease, to come back into play. All the expert evidence supports the
conclusion that the medication has a beneficial effect on the defendant's ability to function
85. See supra text accompanying notes 33-60.
86. See generally Gutheil, Restraint vs. Treatment: Seclusion as Discussed in the Boston State Hospital Case. 137
Am. J. PsYcIJuTY 718 (1980).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 88-94.
88. Id.
89. 89 N.M. 489, 553 P.2d 1296 (Ct. App. 1976).
90. Id. at 492, 553 P.2d at 1299.
91. 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379 (1978).
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and that without the medication he is incompetent to stand trial. There is no evidence that
the defendant's competence to stand trial can be maintained by less intrusive techniques. 92
In State v. Law,93 the South Carolina Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion to the fifth amendment issue presented in both Jojola and Hayes. In
analyzing the effects of the drugs, the court likewise noticed: "The consensus of the
medical testimony at both the competency hearing and trial indicated that the
psychotrophic medications had positive effects, reversing the active state and
allowing [the appellant] to function in a more rational manner. "'94
It is conceivable that the difference in the rights comprising the underlying
subject matter before the civil and criminal courts, one under due process and the
other under the fifth amendment, may have led the courts to perceive the effects of
antipsychotics differently. In civil cases, courts are usually concerned about possible
ill effects of forced treatment on hospitalized psychiatric patients. In contrast, in
criminal cases, courts are generally suspicious of defendants attempting to overturn
convictions on the basis of competency caused by the medication at the time of trial.
Yet, these divergent views on the same medications cannot be justified merely by
saying different constitutional rights are at issue. Either the effects of these
medications extend beyond the mere alleviation of psychotic symptoms or they do
not. Either the drugs adversely affect the patient's mentation or they do not. At the
very least, courts should begin their legal analysis, whether it be in a civil or criminal
action, on the basis of a common set of factual presumptions concerning
antipsychotic medication. Any other result simply serves to bring inconsistency and
confusion when administration of antipsychotics are at issue.
One possible solution to remedy the problems that have been raised may be to
eliminate the patient's right to refuse treatment with antipsychotics. Elimination of
the right to refuse, however, is unacceptable for three reasons. First, the patient
possesses a right to partake in the treatment process. This is a fundamental concept
and cannot be altered. Second, the right to refuse is thoroughly ingrained in many
jurisdictions. Elimination of the right to refuse would result in inconsistency in
judicial decisions as well as legislative policy decisions. Third, elimination of the
right to refuse is unnecessary. The issues raised in this Comment can be adequately
addressed while preserving the patient's right to refuse treatment.
A preferred solution would therefore involve qualifying the existing right to
refuse. As mentioned earlier, antipsychotics do indeed present real dangers to the
patient in the form of deleterious side effects. 95 The courts have been correct in
recognizing that these dangers exist. But the courts have been overly suspicious of the
drugs and have not carefully assessed their therapeutic benefits and the potential
mitigating devices to eliminate the negative side effects. Furthermore, the courts have
been inconsistent, as demonstrated in the contrast with criminal suits, in character-
92. Id. at 461, 389 A.2d at 1381.
93. 270 S.C. 664, 244 S.E.2d 302 (1978).
94. Id. at 671, 244 S.E.2d at 306.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 47-57.
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izing the drugs. A more qualified right would add consistency with the facts as they
exist without eliminating the protection of the patient's liberty interest.
m. DUE PROCESS-THE SECOND AND THIRD ELEMENTS
A. The Proposed Standards and Their Inadequacies
The judicial recognition of an expansive right to refuse treatment for involuntary
patients has not only presented factual and evidentiary problems to the courts, but due
process problems as well. For example, Massachusetts currently employs the
following judicially created due process framework for protecting the involunatary
patient's right to refuse treatment. 96 The determination of a patient's competency is
to be held before the courts. 97 In general, a person, whether committed or not, is
presumed to be competent unless shown by the evidence not to be competent. 98 If the
patient is deemed incompetent, then it is up to the court to appoint a guardian and to
make a "substituted-judgment decision"-that is, it is up to the guardian to make
treatment decisions for the patient. 99 In making the substituted judgment decision, the
court must take into account the following factors: (1) the patient's express
preferences regarding treatment;' ° ° (2) the strength of the patient's convictions to the
extent they contribute to the refusal of treatment; 01 (3) the impact of the decision on
the patient's family;10 2 (4) the probability of adverse side effects;10 3 (5) the prognosis
with treatment; 04 and, (6) the prognosis without treatment. 105 If the judge decides to
order treatment, she must then authorize a detailed treatment program which governs
which drugs are to be used and when they are to be administered. 106 The guardian
would monitor the treatment program. 107
The Massachusetts procedural mechanism poses a number of problems. First, it
places too much confidence in the court to make complex treatment decisions. A
court is simply not trained in prescribing treatment programs and should not attempt
to do so.'0 8 Second, this procedure adds various costs onto the mental health system.
For example, an elaborate due process mechanism may delay effective treatment of
the patient. If in fact antipsychotic treatment is a necessary component of that
treatment, the various due process steps and hurdles will only serve to postpone the
patient's recovery. This delay ultimately hurts the patient and hampers the exigencies
96. In re Roe, I1, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981).
97. Id. at 435, 421 N.E.2d at 52.
98. Id. at 441, 421 N.E.2d at 55.
99. Id. at 442, 421 N.E.2d at 56.






106. Id. at 448, 421 N.E.2d at 59.
107. Id. at 443, 421 N.E.2d at 56.
108. See generally Gutheil, supra note 87. The Third Circuit recognized this limitation in Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d
836 (3d. Cir. 1981), inferring that it is better to have "mental health professionals rather than judges who have doffed
their black robes and donned white coats" make these decisions. Id. at 851.
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of effective medical treatment. In addition, this added delay and resulting litigation
will most certainly raise the price of mental health treatment. Adversarial proceedings
will require expert testimony by psychiatrists, psychologists, and other hospital staff
members. Such expenditures of staff time is a cost to the mental institution which a
state cannot ignore. One may argue in response that these costs are de minimis. But
such an argument ignores the fact that since 1981 state mental health systems have
faced severe cutbacks and financial constraints. 10 9 State mental institutions are
currently operating on a severly limited budget with finite resources available for the
care of the mentally ill. As the Third Circuit in Rennie v. Klein recognized:
"Diversion of these funds to finance nonessential administrative procedures, how-
ever beneficial and desirable, will not provide help for the patient's most critical
needs."110
Another example of the type of due process mechanism that results from the
recognition of an expansive right to refuse treatment is found in the New York Court
of Appeals' decision in Rivers v. Katz. " '1 In Rivers, the court concluded that since
New York's statutory administrative review procedures did not adequately protect the
patient's due process rights, the patient had a right to a judicial hearing to determine
his competency."t 2 The state would bear the burden by clear and convincing evidence
that the patient is incompetent to make his own treatment decisions. 113 If the state
could not meet its burden, the administration of the antipsychotic would be
proscribed. 14 If the patient was found to be incompetent, then the state has to prove
to the court by clear and convincing evidence that the treatment is "narrowly tailored
to give substantive effect to the patient's liberty interest." 115
The New York due process mechanism is flawed, like the Massachusetts plan,
by its inability to recognize any judicial deference to legitimate treatment decisions.
By placing the burden of proof on the state to prove incompetency by clear and
convincing evidence, the New York Court of Appeals' due process mechanism will
most likely chill the entire treatment process. For example, suppose a patient asserts
109. In 1980, the federal government gave $293 million to the states expressly for the delivery and financing of
mental health care. Tir BuotET OF THE UNITED STATEs Govz- tEmr, FiscAL YEAR 1982, at 239-40. In 1981, the amount was
$342 million. THE BuDGET OF MHE UNI.'D STATES GovEpwkNr, 1982 APPisqox at I-K25.
The Reagan Administration, however, changed the method of distribution and the amount of these funds. Under the
1983 budget, the federal government would instead distribute to the states "Block grants," lump-sum payments
consolidating four different areas of federal appropriations which were earlier treated individually by the executive branch.
The four areas "Block grants" cover are: (1) services for women, infants, and children; (2) health prevention and services;
(3) primary care; and, (4) alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health. The Administration tentatively appropriated $433
million of the $1.9 billion total proposed towards alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health-$192 million less than the
amount given in 1980 for alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health. TH BuDGEr OF THE UNrrED STATES GovEaturNr, FiscAl.
YEAR 1983, at 5-134-135. The $1.9 billion appropriated for the "Block grants," however, turned out to be merely a
proposal; only $1.2 billion was actually distributed in 1983. THE BuoGor OF THE UNTrED STATES GovEs.%iEr, FiscAL YEAs
1985, at 5-130. Thus, the amount given to the states for mental health services was probably much less. The
Administration's proposal for 1988 remains at $1.2 billion. THE BuGEr OF THE UnrrnE STATES GOVERNMENT, FiscAL YEAR
1988, at 5-110.
110. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 851 (3d Cir. 1981).
111. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986).
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his right to refuse. The state has two options in responding. First, it could respond
with vigor and the hospital, consistent with its position as a "caring institution,"
could gather evidence and expend a great deal of its resources in defeating the
patient's assertion. The state, however, will probably not choose this option because
of the inherent costs involved in litigating the patient's right. Therefore, New York's
proposal, by putting the burden of proof upon the state, forces New York's mental
institutions to initiate the due process mechanism and, consequently, initiate the
spending of its limited resources. This is clearly not within the institution's best
interests. This leads to the second and more probable option. The state could simply
refuse to litigate the patient's assertion because the costs to the entire institution
outweigh the benefits to the patient in defeating his right-to-refuse assertion. The
hospital would therefore have no other choice than concede to the patient's demand.
Thus, those patients who are incompetent could make such demands and would never
be properly treated. As a consequence, the New York plan will most likely chill the
entire treatment process. The New York Court of Appeals' skepticism simply does
not serve the state's nor the patient's legitimate interests in mental health treatment.
B. Alternative Factors in Devising Due Process Protection
Though some type of due process protection is needed to preserve an involuntary
patient's right to refuse, the proposals set forth to date do not, in general, provide
adequate, efficient, or realistic due process safeguards. Inherent in all of the
procedural proposals is the misconception that treatment with antipsychotics is
presumptively sinister and protection from these "mind controllers" is necessi-
tated.116 The proposals refuse to defer to psychiatric decisions and instead insist on
a high level of judicial scrutiny over these professional decisions.117 Furthermore,
each of these devices add additional costs onto under-budgeted health care systems.
If a more qualified right to refuse is instead adopted, the due process protection
mechanisms will in turn become more limited. This Part will set forth alternative
factors for states to consider in crafting due process protection for a more limited right
to refuse.
First, the nature of the treatment with antipsychotics must be more realistically
appraised. The state must determine whether the mitigating factors of medical
supervision and remedial action are present and to what extent. Such a determination
will reduce legitimate concerns for the potential deleterious side effects of
antispychotics. The state must determine the duration of the treatment with
antipsychotics for, as discussed earlier, tardive dyskinesia arises most frequently
when antipsychotics are used for a long period of time. Finally, the availability of
alternatives to antipsychotics must also be considered. By using another medication
other than antipsychotics to treat the patient, the entire right-to-refuse problem could
be reduced if not eliminated.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 61-93.
117. Id.
[Vol. 48:11331148
1987] ANTIPSYCHOTIC DRUGS 1149
Second, the burdens of proof ought to be reversed. The courts recognizing a
right to refuse have found that due process mandates that there must be an initial
determination of the patient's competency. If the patient is competent to make his
own treatment decisions, he then presumptively has the right to refuse medication he
does not wish to take. This notion is dictated by the law of battery and by the principle
of autonomy which underlies the physician-patient relationship."18 If the patient is
deemed incompetent, then the courts have found that due process requires the
treatment prescribed to be "least restrictive." The state would bear the burden of
proof in each of these determinations (competency and the nature of the treatment). t9
But, if the courts recognize a more qualifed right to refuse treatment with
antipsychotics, with an acknowledgment that antipsychotics do not pose as great a
threat to the patient as earlier believed, then coupled with that recognition would be
a due process mechanism which is less comprehensive. Consistent with a less
comprehensive due process procedure would then be a reallocation of burdens, for if
the danger is not that great, then the patient ought to bear the burden of proof if the
right to refuse is asserted. 120 In addition, this allocation is more consistent with the
fact that since the patient is involuntarily committed, there exists a presumption in
favor of treatment on the part of the state. 21 Moreover, this allocation will tend to
limit "frivolous" right-to-refuse claims and enable the mental health institution, and
indeed the system generally, to operate more efficiently.122
Third, the state must consider the limitations of the judiciary in making medical
treatment and diagnosis decisions. Such decisions require attention to intricate details
and cannot be broadly discarded with a consitutional brush. The Supreme Court's
words in Youngberg v. Romeo 23 should not be ignored for there is a great deal of
practical wisdom in holding medical decisions "presumptively valid."1 24 There are
limits to the reach of judicial reasoning and complex medical diagnosis decisions are,
arguably, one of those limits. 125 The issues courts and psychiatrists face are very
different and personal liberty interests should not be sacrificed for more deference to
medical decisions. But at least courts and state legislatures should be aware of those
limits and incorporate them into their respective analyses of the right-to-refuse
problem. Such an awareness makes for better reasoning.
118. See generally B. FsRxow, S. JOHNSON, T. Josr, & R. SChwARtz, HEALTu LAw: CASES, MATE-LMS AND PROEaMS
853-906 (1987) (discussing the "right to die" of incompetent patients). See also infra note 120.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 96-115.
120. Possible alternatives for the patient would be to sue the state for battery if in fact the determination of
incompetency turns out to be erroneous or the treatment prescribed is not "least restrictive." See W. KEros, D. DOBBS,
R. KEsro.i & D. OW-e, PROSSER & KEEON o-; ToRTs § 9 (1984).
121. See supra text accompanying note 80.
122. For example, suppose the patient is incompetent and is in need of anitpsychotic treatment, yet asserts his right
to refuse treatment. The resulting due process procedure will most likely be long, arduous, and costly. If the process
determines that the patient is competent and needs treatment, then the process was a waste. If instead the burden were on
the patient, this would most likely deter him from asserting such a claim and would cut down on the number of
right-to-refuse treatment assertions. In turn, this would result in quicker adjudications.
123. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
124. Id. at 323.
125. See supra note 108. Cf. Jarvis v. Levine, 403 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. App. 1987) (the "professional judgment"
standard of Youngberg v. Romeo is all that is necessary for due process requirements to be met).
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Fourth, the patient's interest in successful long-range treatment must be
considered. Courts and legislatures must be aware of the inherent stress-creating
atmosphere of adversarial proceedings. 126 These proceedings are therefore more
likely to be counterproductive to treatment, adding to the tensions that may have
contributed to the patient's initial commitment to the institution. 2 7 The state
therefore must consider this factor if it wishes to facilitate successful long-range
treatment of its mentally ill.
Fifth, and finally, states must consider the fiscal constraints mental institutions
now face. When the right-to-refuse cases first arose, in the late 1970s, mental
institutions were still relatively well-funded. But the 1980s have seen a severe
cutback in federal funding of state mental health systems.128 Expansive protection for
patients against reasonable professional treatment decisions adds costs onto these
systems which they simply cannot afford. A more qualified right to refuse can reduce
some of these costs while not sacrificing the patient's protected liberty interest.
IV. CONCLUSION
The involuntary patient's right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs has
presented various legal, factual, and policy problems to the states. Antispychotics
simply do not pose as great of a danger to the patient as the courts have presented.
The dangers that do exist can be mitigated through various medical procedures.
Moreover, recognition of a more qualifed right to refuse, as proposed, does not
eliminate the patient's right, but simply curtails it. The patient still possesses a
protected liberty interest, but the protection provided is more limited. A qualified
right to refuse treatment would be more consistent with the facts as they exist,
adequately promote the state's interest in treating its involuntarily committed
mentally ill, and better serve the mental health system's interest on the whole, for
needed funds would not be diverted. In conclusion, a more qualifed right to refuse
would not substantially hurt the involuntary patient and would substantially benefit
the state, its mental institutions, and, ultimately, the patient himself.
James A. King
126. See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 851 (3d Cir. 1981).
127. Id.
128. See supra note 109.
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